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I. INTRODUCTION
Libel cases are often won or lost by how the court classifies the
defamed plaintiff. Since New York Times Co. v. Sullivan' and its
progeny, courts require plaintiffs who are "public officials" or
"public figures" to prove a higher standard of fault on the part of
the defendant/media than "private individuals." Broadly stated,
public officials and public figures must show that the media acted
with "actual malice," while private individuals need only show that
the media acted with some level of negligence, which is determined
on a state by state basis.2
The significance of the different classifications should not be
taken lightly. Although the possibility that a plaintiff will not be
classified as a public figure is sufficient to ensure a steady supply
of defamation plaintiffs, very few who are found to be public
1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
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figures ultimately prevail in suits for defamation.3 Consequently,
the "public figure" classification becomes particularly important to
athletes and entertainers. As personalities in the public eye, ath-
letes and entertainers are constantly exposed to public criticism
and potentially defamatory media coverage. Since their livelihood
and income largely depend upon their good reputations, any de-
famatory statements made about athletes or entertainers can be
quite damaging. Given that they are in the public eye, should ath-
letes and entertainers be required to meet the stringent actual
malice test? Moreover, should all athletes and entertainers be
treated the same-i.e., should Dan Andreescu 4 or Carol Vitale' be
burdened by the same standard of fault as Johnny Carson6 or
Muhammed Ali?7
This article attempts to examine these questions. First, it
breaks down the various categories of "public figures"-namely,
pervasive public figures, vortex public figures and public personali-
ties-which courts have applied to athletes and entertainers in the
past. Second, it analyzes the criteria and definitions which those
courts traditionally looked to for guidance. Third, the article offers
clearer tests for categorizing athletes and entertainers as "public
figures." In particular, it offers a unique and comprehensive six-
factor test for determining if a plaintiff is a pervasive public figure
and expands the traditional two-part test for determining if a
plaintiff is a vortex public figure. Finally, it applies these tests to
particular athletes and entertainers to see where courts have been
correct in their classifications and where they have erred.
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
As noted above, the Supreme Court held in 1964 that a "pub-
lic official" may recover damages for a defamatory falsehood relat-
ing to his official conduct only if he or she proves that the state-
ment was made with "actual malice."8 The Court defined actual
malice as "knowledge that [the statement] was false or . . . reck-
less disregard of whether it was false or not."9
3. Schauer, Public Figures, 25 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 905, 907-08 (1983). See also
Franklin, Winners and Losers and Why: A Study of Defamation Litigation, 1980 AM. B.
FOUND. RESEARCH J. 455.
4. Andreescu was a harness racer in the late 1970s.
5. Vitale was a Playboy "Playmate of the Month" in the mid 1970s.
6. Carson is a well-known entertainer and comedian.
7. Ali was three time heavyweight boxing Champion in the 1960s and 1970s.
8. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 283-84.
9. Id. at 279-80.
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The decision marked a significant change from the common
law in that it afforded the media legal immunity even though the
published statement may have been false. This immunity, derived
from the first amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and
press, is based on the recognition that individual interests must
frequently yield to the greater constitutional right to disseminate
news.
The Court in Sullivan, however, left several questions unan-
swered. First, it did not define with any specificity the term "reck-
less disregard" as used within the meaning of actual malice. More-
over, the Court did not delineate who fell within the definition of
"public official," specifically leaving this issue for future
consideration. 0
In 1967 the Supreme Court extended the Sullivan actual mal-
ice standard to "public figures" as well as public officials. 1 In a
concurring opinion, Justice Warren justified this extension by stat-
ing that public figures, like public officials, often "play an influen-
tial role in ordering society . . . . Our citizenry has a legitimate
and substantial interest in the conduct of such persons .... ""
The Court could not, however, get a majority of the Justices to
agree on a precise meaning of the phrase "public figure." Justice
Harlan's opinion did help to define more clearly the meaning of
"reckless disregard." He interpreted it as conduct "constituting an
extreme departure from the standards of investigation and report-
ing ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers."' 3
The meaning of reckless disregard was further expanded in
several later cases. In 1968, for example, the Court stated that
there must be some reason for the reporter or publisher to doubt
the validity of the defamatory statement and, if there is some
10. Id. at 283 n.23. Athletes and entertainers, as such, cannot be classified as public
officials in that they hold no public office, either elected or appointed. Athletes and enter-
tainers turned politicians-such as Bill Bradley, Jack Kemp or Clint Eastwood-would be
considered public officials and be forced to meet the actual malice standard. In defining who
may be classified as a public official, courts have articulated some factors which are equally
applicable to athletes and entertainers. See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
11. Curtis Publishing Co, 388 U.S. 130. Although the decision was highly fragmented,
five justices (Warren, Black, Douglas, Brennan and White) agreed that the actual malice
standard should apply to public figures. Justice Harlan, speaking for the remaining four
justices, held that a public figure should not have to face as strict a test in bringing a libel
suit as a public official should, but must only show "highly unreasonable conduct" on the
part of the media defendant. Id. at 155.
12. Id. at 164.
13. Id. at 155. This definition does not necessarily correspond to the reckless disregard
language of the actual malice test. For example, Justice Harlan rejected the actual malice
standard as to public figures in favor of his "highly unreasonable conduct" standard. Id.
19871
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doubt, the reporter must use reasonable means to verify the state-
ment.1 4 The Circuit Court for the District of Columbia has further
stated that objective evidence such as time constraints, reliability
of sources, reasonableness of checking the veracity of the state-
ment, and potential damage to the plaintiff5 may be used to show
reckless disregard.
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc." the Supreme Court held that
any plaintiff who is neither a "public official" nor a "public figure"
must be considered a private individual and, as such, is exempted
from the actual malice standard.17 The Court held that as long as
states do not impose liability without fault, they may "define for
themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or
broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individ-
ual. '18 Currently, thirty states and Puerto Rico require that a pri-
vate individual show only negligence on the part of the defendant/
media, New York requires a showing of gross irresponsibility, and
four states 9 require a showing of actual malice.20
The Gertz Court also defined more clearly what was meant by
"public figure." It held there are two types of public figures: "per-
vasive public figures" and "vortex public figures." A pervasive pub-
lic figure is a person who has achieved such "pervasive fame or
notoriety" or who occupies a position of such "pervasive power and
influence" that he is deemed a public figure for all purposes and in
all contexts.2 The Court also stated that one should not be
deemed a pervasive public figure absent "clear evidence of general
fame or notoriety in the community and pervasive involvement in
the affairs of society."22 A vortex public figure is one who volunta-
rily thrusts himself into a particular public controversy, thereby
becoming a public figure for a limited range of issues related to
that controversy.23 The Court extended public figure status to indi-
viduals who have not voluntarily entered a public controversy, but
who are drawn into one. In short, a court must determine whether
14. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
15. Tavoulareas v. Washington Post, 763 F.2d 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
16. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
17. Id. at 351-52.
18. Id. at 351.
19. Alaska, Colorado, Indiana and Michigan.
20. The remaining states have not yet rendered a decision on this issue. Constitu-
tional Privilege in Libel Law, 1 Communications Law 1986 (Practicing Law Institute) at
145-50 (Nov. 1986).
21. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351.
22. Id. at 352.
23. Id. at 351.
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the plaintiff has thrust himself into the "vortex" of a public issue
or has engaged the public's attention in an attempt to influence
the outcome.
The Supreme Court also recognized the importance of plain-
tiffs involved in general public controversies as opposed to involve-
ment in particular public debates. For example, in 1971, the Court
extended the actual malice standard to private individuals in-
volved in matters of public or general interest.24 Although this de-
cision was explicitly overruled by Gertz,26 the existence of a public
controversy continues to play an important role in determining the
status of a libel plaintiff. The existence of a public controversy is
also significant in assessing punitive damages. Although Gertz held
that a private individual could not recover punitive damages ab-
sent a showing of actual malice, courts presently allow private
plaintiffs to recover such damages absent actual malice if the state-
ments "do not involve matters of public concern. '"26
III. CLASSIFYING ATHLETES AND ENTERTAINERS
A. Pervasive Public Figures
As noted above, a pervasive public figure is one who has gen-
eral fame or notoriety in the community and has pervasive involve-
ment in the affairs of society so that he is deemed a public figure
for all purposes and in all contexts.2 7 In Time, Inc. v. Firestone,
the Supreme Court stated that such a plaintiff must have assumed
a "role of especial prominence in the affairs of society...
However, the Supreme Court has failed to delineate exactly
what makes a person "of general fame or notoriety" or "of especial
prominence in the affairs of society" so as to render them a perva-
sive public figure. Thus, the lower courts have had no clear guide-
lines to follow when classifying libel plaintiffs and have not been
systematic in their analysis.
1. SIX FACTOR TEST
The following is a six-factor test which may be used to deter-
mine if a plaintiff is a pervasive public figure. While different
24. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
25. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351.
26. Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
27. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352. Courts also refer to such plaintiffs as "general public
figures."
28. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 453 (1976).
19871
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courts have looked at all of the factors individually, no court has
engaged in a comprehensive examination of all the factors. 9
a. Access to the Media
It is generally assumed that all pervasive public figures have
access to the press. This was made clear by the Supreme Court in
Gertz:
The first remedy of any victim of defamation is self-
help-using available opportunities to contradict the lie or cor-
rect the error and thereby to minimize its adverse impact on
reputation. Public officials and public figures usually enjoy sig-
nificantly greater access to the channels of effective communica-
tion and hence have a more realistic opportunity to counteract
false statements than private individuals normally enjoy.30
The Supreme Court also noted in Gertz that while the opportunity
to rebut is not always effective in undoing the harm, the ability to
do so is still relevant to the inquiry.31
The importance of access to the media was articulated in
Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications Inc. 2 The court held that a
pervasive public figure must have access to the media if defamed.
"The public's proven preoccupation with him indicates that the
media would cover such an individual's response to statements he
believes are inaccurate or unsupported."'33 It is significant that in
every case where a court has classified an entertainer as a perva-
sive public figure, the plaintiff has had access to the media as de-
29. The best analysis was conducted by the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia in Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Even
this analysis, however, was not comprehensive.
30. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344. As noted by the Court, the plaintiff's access to the media
was also relevant in determining "public official" status. Id. at 344. The Court held in
Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979) that "public official" was not synonymous with
"public employee," when it decided that a research scientist who had received federal fund-
ing for his research was still a private individual. Id. at 119 n.8 (1979). It based the conclu-
sion on several factors, the most prominent of which was that the plaintiff "did not have the
regular and continuing access to the media" to warrant imposition of the actual malice stan-
dard. Id. at 119.
A Wisconsin circuit court held that the appointed members of a state technical college's
board of directors were public officials. Bower v. Wisconsin Vocational Technical & Adult
Education Board, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2372, (Dist Ct. Wis. 1983). The court relied on the
finding that the directors exercised substantial authority over matters of public concern and
they had "access to the media, through which they could respond to the published state-
ments they found objectionable." Id. at 2379.
31. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344.
32. 627 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
33. Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1294.
[Vol. 4:333
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b. Assumption of risk
It is generally accepted that all pervasive public figures have
assumed the risk of closer scrutiny by the media. "The communi-
cations media are entitled to act on the assumption that public
officials and public figures have voluntarily exposed themselves to
increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood concerning
them." s4 Unlike private individuals, public officials who accept
public office and public figures have assumed an "influential role in
ordering society."85
This factor was enunciated in Waldbaum. A famous person's
"renouncement of anonymity or tolerance of publicity" amounts to
an implied assumption of the possibility that the media will com-
ment on his talents, character, or motives.86 The court declared
that the media's reporting and critiquing of famous persons is one
of its fundamental roles. "The media serve as a check on the power
of the famous, and that check must be strongest when the subject's
influence is strongest.""
There is a strong suggestion that the plaintiff need not have
voluntarily attained celebrity status to be a pervasive public fig-
ure. 8 "Hypothetically, it may be possible for someone to become a
public figure through no purposeful action of his own. . .,"9 The
Waldbaum court stated that when someone steps into the public
spotlight, or when he is "cast into it," he must take the bad with
the good.40
c. Fame or Notoriety
Courts should determine the familiarity of the plaintiff. The
court in Waldbaum held that "a general public figure is a well-
known 'celebrity,' his name a 'household word.' ,'41 To ascertain
34. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
35. Curtis Publishing Co., 388 U.S. at 164.
36. Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1294.
37. Id. This comment also relates to factor number four-the plaintiff's ability to in-
fluence others. See infra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
38. Assumption of the risk as applied in this analysis does not necessarily mean volun-
tariness. Rather, it seems to mean that a person implicitly assumes the risk of heightened
criticism when he or she becomes pervasively famous or notorious, whether voluntarily or
not.
39. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
40. Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1294-95.
41. Id. at 1295.
19871
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this, the court cited two factors which should be considered. The
first is a statistical survey of how well the plaintiff's name is recog-
nized."2 "We conclude that 'general' fame means being known to a
large percentage of the well-informed citizenry. . .a majority or
more of the public must [not necessarily] know of the plaintiff."
The second is the previous coverage of the plaintiff in the press."3
Courts must examine these elements as they existed before the
defamation was published. "Otherwise, the press could convert a
private individual into a general public figure simply by publicizing
the defamation itself and creating a controversy surrounding
it. .... "
The Seventh Circuit, for example, found Johnny Carson to be
an "all-purpose" public figure.4 5 The court stated that Carson "en-
joyed an excellent name and reputation both internationally and
throughout the United States as being one of the more popular
and outstanding practitioners of his profession."'4" Similarly, a Ne-
vada District Court found Wayne Newton "to be a general purpose
public figure. 4 7 The court, however, engaged in little analysis con-
cerning the pervasiveness of Newton's fame in determining his sta-
tus as a general public figure.
d. Ability to Influence the Public
Courts also look at the plaintiff's ability to influence the gen-
eral public. The court in Waldbaum noted that judges should
"check whether others in fact alter or reevaluate their conduct or
ideas in light of the plaintiffs action. ' 48 The court also held that
this standard is not subjective, but an objective one which asks
whether a reasonable person would conclude that the public is in-
42. Id. at 1295 n.20.
43. Id. at 1295.
44. Id. at 1295 n.19.
45. Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976).
46. Id. at 209-10. The court also held Carson's wife to be a limited public figure:".
the wife of a public figure such as Carson more or less automatically becomes at least a part-
time public figure herself." Id. at 210.
47. Newton v. NBC, 12 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1252 (D. Nev. 1985).
48. Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1295. Similarly, a major factor that courts consider when
determining whether a plaintiff is a "public official" is the plaintiff's policy-making author-
ity. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1986). While athletes and entertainers generally have
no policy-making authority per se, they may have an indirect impact on policy because the
public will listen and possibly act upon the athlete's or entertainer's opinion. The fact that
most athletes and entertainers have no direct control over public policy has led some schol-
ars to suggest that it may be undesirable to extend the actual malice standard to the group
labelled "public figures". See generally Schauer, supra note 3.
[Vol. 4:333
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fluenced by the plaintiff's actions.49
With specific reference to athletes and entertainers, the court
stated
... that many well-known athletes, entertainers, and other per-
sonages endorse commercial products, publicly support political
candidates, or take open stands on public issues. This phenome-
non, regardless of whether it is justified, indicates that famous
persons may be able to transfer their recognition and influence
from one field to another. . . . A person's power to capitalize on
his general fame by lending his name to products, candidates,
and causes indicates the broad influence he hasY5
Furthermore, it is appropriate for the press to scrutinize a
plaintiff more closely when he or she has the ability to affect a
variety of areas. Such scrutiny will "educate the public on the fa-
mous person's actual expertise with reference to whom or what he
is promoting." '51 Thus, the ability to influence the public is relevant
in justifying the imposition of the stricter actual malice standard
for all aspects of the plaintiff's life.
e. Pursuit of Media Attention
Courts should determine if the plaintiff has actively pursued
media attention and publicity or if he or she has tried to shun pub-
lic attention. As the New York Court of Appeals held in Maule v.
NYM Corp.,52 "the critical consideration in this case is whether the
evidence demonstrates that plaintiff had taken affirmative steps to
attract personal attention or had strived to achieve a measure of
public acclaim." 53 In Maule, the plaintiff, a well-known sports-
writer for Sports Illustrated, author of twenty-eight books, and a
frequent public speaker, was found to be a public figure. The court
held that ". . . plaintiff not only welcomed but actively sought
publicity for his views and professional writing and by his own
purposeful activities thrust himself into the public eye. He had be-
come a public personality. 54
Courts have also indicated that a plaintiff may continue to be
49. Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1294 n.15.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1294.
52. 54 N.Y.2d 880, 429 N.E.2d 416, 444 N.Y.S.2d 909 (1981).
53. Id. at 881-82, 429 N.E.2d 447, 444 N.Y.S.2d 910.
54. Id. at 883, 429 N.E.2d at 418, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 911. The language "public personal-
ity" is somewhat confusing here, because some persons classified as "public personalities"
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a pervasive public figure even though he no longer pursues public-
ity and seeks anonymity instead. A person who announces that he
no longer desires press coverage and refuses to grant interviews,
"may be continuing in a career that captivates the public, be it in
politics, business, the arts, sports or entertainment.""5 In short,
".... because he has chosen to occupy a position that places him in
the spotlight and thereby may make him influential, he retains his
access to the media and has invited continued attention and
comment. ''66
f. Existence of Public Issues
Courts should also determine if issues of public interest ex-
ist.57 "'Public figures' are those persons who, though not public
officials, are 'involved in issues in which the public has a justified
and important interest.' Such figures . . . include artists, athletes,
business people, .... ."58 Thus, it is relevant to the analysis to as-
certain whether a plaintiff is involved in issues of public interest,
even if he or she is not specifically trying to influence the outcome
of those issues, or even if he or she may be less of a celebrity than
Johnny Carson or Wayne Newton.
In using this six-factor analysis, however, courts should remain
aware that these factors are not absolute criteria for determining
who is or is not a pervasive public figure. They are merely elements
55. Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1295 n.21.
56. Id. This may apply to persons such as baseball player Steve Carlton. Although he
has attempted to avoid the press, the media continues to follow his career because of his
previous fame and because he probably retains his pervasive public figure status.
57. Although the Rosenbloom extension of the actual malice standard to private indi-
viduals involved in matters of public interest was explicitly overruled by the Supreme Court
in Gertz, courts have considered, and should continue to consider the existence of public
interest as a factor when determining pervasive public figure status. Rosenbloom v. Me-
tromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
58. Montandon v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 45 Cal. App. 3d 938, 946, 120 Cal. Rptr.
186, 191 (1975). This definition was taken from Cepeda v. Cowles Magazines and Broadcast-
ing, Inc., 392 F.2d 417 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 840 (1968), a case which involved a
famous baseball player. In this case, there was a strong indication that Cepeda was not
declared a pervasive or all-purpose public figure and that the alleged libel concerned his
competence as a baseball player. There was a suggestion that Cepeda was classified as a
"public personality," a status which is analogous to a pervasive public figure", but which is
confined to the plaintiff's limited realm, which was baseball. See infra notes 132-33 and
accompanying text.
There is good reason to believe that Montandon, an author and television personality,
was classified as a pervasive public figure even though the Cepeda test of public personality
was used. This is because the alleged libel did not concern her role as an author, but dealt
with her private life as the story intimated that plaintiff was a "call-girl." Montandon, 45
Cal. App. 3d at 941, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
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to be weighed and balanced against each other. As the Waldbaum
Court stated in reference to its own more limited list of factors:
"No one parameter is dispositive; the decision still involves an ele-
ment of judgment. Nevertheless, the weighing of these and other
relevant factors can lead to a more accurate-and more predict-
able-assessment of a person's overall fame and notoriety ..
2. APPLICATION TO ATHLETES AND ENTERTAINERS
It is clear that several generalizations can be made in applying
this analysis to entertainers and athletes. First, courts assign per-
vasive public figure status to entertainers too freely today. As
noted above, pervasive public figure status was applied to Johnny
Carson,0° Wayne Newton,61 Pat Montandon,62 and Hamilton "Tex"
Maule6 The latter two applications were inappropriate under the
above six-factor test.
The Court in Gertz made clear that only a minority of public
figures were to be designated as pervasive public figures." While
some plaintiffs may "occupy positions of such pervasive power and
influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes
... .More commonly, those classed as public figures will be vor-
tex public figures"-i.e., they have thrust themselves into the vor-
tex of a public controversy in order to influence the resolution of
the issues involved.6 5
In addition, the result of being declared a pervasive public fig-
ure necessarily connotes a significant burden on a plaintiff in a def-
amation action.6 If such a person is considered a public figure "for
all purposes," regardless of the personal or private nature of the
issue, the pervasive public figure status should not be imposed
liberally.
59. Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1295.
60. Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976).
61. Newton v. NBC, 12 Media L. Rep. 1252 (Dist. Ct. Nev. 1985).
62. Montandon, 45 Cal. App. 3d 938, 120 Cal. Rptr. 1986.
63. Maule v. NYM Corp., 54 N.Y.2d 880, 429 N.E.2d 416, 444 N.Y.S.2d 909 (1981).
64. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974).
65. Id. (emphasis added) For further discussion on "vortex public figures," see infra
notes 85-126 and accompanying text.
66. See generally Franklin, supra note 3. Franklin suggested that very few plaintiffs
who are declared pervasive public figures are likely to prevail at trial. Id. at 908.
The most prominent exception is Burnett v. National Enquirer, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
1321 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1981), modified, 144 Cal. App. 3d 991, 193 Cal. Rptr. 206 (1983), ap-
peal dismissed, 465 U.S. 1014 (1984). This case, however, should not be viewed as denying
the difficulty of prevailing in the face of the actual malice standard. See Schauer, supra note
3, at 908 n.23.
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A careful analysis of the six factors to the following cases
reveals the courts have overly applied the pervasive public figure
status to entertainers.
In Maule v. NYM Corp.,'7 plaintiff Hamilton "Tex" Maule
was a writer for Sports Illustrated, author of many books on foot-
ball and baseball, and a frequent public speaker concerning sports.
The court said the "critical question" in determining Maule's sta-
tus as a pervasive public figure was his "affirmative steps to attract
personal attention to achieve a measure of public acclaim." 5 The
court, however, ignored other critical factors.
The court glossed over the third factor of how well-known the
plaintiff is. While Maule was certainly a well-known sportswriter,
it is doubtful that he was a "celebrity" or "household word" within
the meaning of Waldbaum. Maule was probably not known to a
large percentage of the well-informed citizenry, whether sports
fans or not, and was not the subject of much previous coverage,
other than articles bearing his byline."'
More importantly, there is no evidence that Maule had any
influence over public opinion or conduct, the fourth factor. While
Maule may have been authoritative in his field, he made no at-
tempt to transfer that recognition and influence from one field to
another. He endorsed no products, supported no political candi-
dates and took no stands on public issues.7* Although it is true
that Maule sought publicity to help further his career, he did not
use his recognition in any meaningful way to influence others.7 1
In Montandon v. Triangle Publications, Inc.,7 Pat Montan-
don was a minor television personality and the author of the book
"How to Be a Party Girl." The court avoided any real analysis on
the issue of whether Montandon was a pervasive public figure by
stating that "it is unnecessary to detail the evidence showing that
Miss Montandon is a public figure and a person of general new-
sworthiness." '78 Rather, it relied on the more expansive Cepeda
definition of public figure which is akin to a "public personality. '7 4
67. 54 N.Y.2d 880, 429 N.E.2d 416, 444 N.Y.S.2d 909 (1981).
68. Id. at 881-82, 429 N.E.2d at 417, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 910.
69. See supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
70. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
71. Additionally, the alleged libel concerned plaintiff's professional abilities rather
than a private aspect of his life. This suggests that the court mistakenly applied pervasive
public figure status, but should have applied vortex public figure or public personality
status.
72. 45 Cal. App. 3d 938, 120 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1975).
73. Id. at 941, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
74. See supra note 58. Because it was clear that the alleged defamation here relates to
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Even a cursory analysis under the six-factor test shows that
Montandon is not a pervasive public figure. She was neither a "ce-
lebrity" as defined in the test, nor did she have any meaningful
influence over the public beyond the scope of her book. She did
not use her limited recognition to advance other ideas or beliefs.
She only wrote a book and appeared on television talk shows in an
attempt to publicize it.
Second, and contrary to the first generalization, courts today
are unwilling to apply pervasive public figure status to athletes.
The greatest support for this assertion is that there are no cases on
record where an athlete has explicitly been deemed a pervasive
public figure. While this result may once have been justifiable be-
cause athletes tended not to use their recognition to influence the
public and had less access to the press concerning non-sports is-
sues, this is no longer true. Today's big-name athletes are much
more willing to transfer their influence and recognition from the
sports world to political, social, and economic forums. 5
Of particular importance to classifying athletes is the concept
of "limited pervasive public figures.""6 Some courts have indicated
that a plaintiff need not satisfy the requirements to be a pervasive
public figure across the country, but may be a pervasive public fig-
ure only in some limited local community.77
This concept originates from the language of Gertz. The Court
noted that Gertz had "no general fame and notoriety in the com-
munity" and that he was not generally known to "the local popu-
lation. '78 Although it is clear from this language that the plaintiff
need not possess national fame, it is unclear what the relevant
''community" or "local population" must be.
On one hand, it has been suggested that the relevant commu-
nity refers to the area to which the defamatory statement was dis-
seminated. "We . . . conclude that nationwide fame is not re-
quired. Rather, the question is whether the individual had
achieved the necessary degree of notoriety where he was de-
private facts, as opposed to facts related to plaintiff's occupation, the court is purposely
imposing pervasive public figure status on Montandon. Thus, the court simply used the
wrong definition and did not engage in any pervasive public figure analysis.
75. Jack Kemp and Bill Bradley are both former professional athletes who have
moved into the political arena.
76. This is because most athletes who are not prominent national stars are still well-
known in their local community (a limited geographical area round where they play their
home games) but are not as famous elsewhere.
77. E.g., From v. Tallahassee Democrat, Inc., 400 So. 2d 52, 55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1981).
78. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351-52.
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famed-i.e., where the defamation was published. ' 79 The rationale
behind this view is not only that a plaintiff may be well-known in a
limited community, but also that he may have access to the media
and/or influence on the public only in that limited community.
Problems arise here when the area of publication is larger than the
area of plaintiffs fame."'
On the other hand, it has also been suggested that the relevant
"community" refers to some distinct geographical area. In Wil-
liams v. Pasma,81 for example, the Montana Supreme Court held
that the plaintiff, an unsuccessful candidate for the United States
Senate and a former chairman of the Montana Republican Party,
was a pervasive public figure in Montana.
Some courts have hinted that national notoriety is neces-
sary to attain general public figure status .... However, we
cannot find any authority from the United States Supreme
Court nor State Supreme Court cases that expressly sets such a
requirement. In fact, the language 'in the community' appears to
require only local notoriety. We find . . . [plaintiff's] activities
do establish clear evidence that Williams had general fame or
notoriety in.the community (Montana) and exhibited pervasive
involvement in the affairs of society and thus was a public figure
as a matter of law.82 (emphasis added).
However, this concept also has the inherent problem of defining
the appropriate geographical boundaries. It has been suggested
that the geographical area could be determined by such factors as
how far television and radio broadcasts of the plaintiff's team's
games are transmitted" or by the area which receives newspaper
coverage of the team."
B. Vortex Public Figures
"Vortex public figures" are those persons who are not perva-
sive public figures, but who have voluntarily injected themselves,
79. Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1295-96 n.22 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
80. The court in Waldbaum suggested that "it might be appropriate to treat the plain-
tiff as a public figure for the segment of the audience to which he or she is well-known and
as a private individual for the rest." Id. This would have an effect on assessing damages.
81. 202 Mont. 66, 656 P.2d 212 (1982).
82. Id.
83. A problem with this is the existence of cable TV and "national" channels such as
Ted Turner's WTBS, which broadcasts Atlanta Braves and Atlanta Hawks games nation-
wide, and WGN, which broadcasts Chicago Cubs games nationwide.
84. Waldbaum, 627 F.2d 1287, 1295-96 & n.22.
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or have been involuntarily injected by events, into the vortex of a
particular controversy of public interest. As such, they are treated
as public figures within the meaning of Butts and Gertz.85 The Su-
preme Court in Gertz stated that such public figures are those that
have "thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public con-
troversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues in-
volved." 6 The Gertz Court also said that a vortex public figure is
"an individual [who] voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a
particular controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a
limited range of issues." 7
In Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n,88 the Supreme Court ex-
plained that the "actual malice" constitutional privilege, as applied
to vortex public figures, rests upon two considerations. 9 First, a
vortex public figure is less vulnerable to a defamatory statement
because he has access to the press and the ability to set the record
straight.9" This access is based on the presumption that the public
wishes to hear, and the media is willing to publish, the plaintiff's
views on important public issues in which the plaintiff is involved.
Second, a vortex public figure has assumed the risk of damaging
statements by voluntarily entering the public arena." This reflects
the Gertz requirement that the plaintiff must have thrust himself
into the public controversy in order to influence the resolution of
the issues involved.
When determining who is a vortex public figure, courts need
not undergo the six-factor test recommended for pervasive public
figures. Rather, there is a two-pronged analysis: "First, a 'public
controversy' must exist. . . Second, the nature and extent of the
individual's participation in the particular controversy must be as-
85. Thus, the plaintiff must show that defendant knew the statement was false or ex-
hibited reckless disregard as to whether or not it was false. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964).
86. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
87. Id. at 351.
88. 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
89. Id. at 164.
90. Id. at 162.
91. Id. at 164. The court in Wolston substantially limited the scope of those plaintiffs
who may be cast into the Gertz category of involuntary vortex public figures. The court held
that: "a private individual is not automatically transformed into a public figure just by be-
coming involved in or associated with a matter that attracts public attention." Id. at 167.
There is still some indication that involuntary public figures are possible. "Hypotheti-
cally, it may be possible for someone to become a public figure through no purposeful action
of is own, but the instances of truly involuntary public figures must be exceedingly rare."
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345 (emphasis added).
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certained."' This analysis is further underscored by the Wolston
requirements that the plaintiff have access to the press and to
some degree, assume the risk of close media scrutiny.
1. PUBLIC CONTROVERSY
The Supreme Court has not clearly defined the elements of a
public controversy."' However, lower courts have offered some gen-
eral guidance in the area. The Sixth Circuit, for example, noted
that a public controversy "is not simply any controversy of general
or public interest." ' The Third Circuit stated that a public contro-
versy must be a dispute which will, when resolved, affect some seg-
ment of the general public other than its immediate participants. 5
Finally, the District Court for the District of Columbia held that a
public controversy "is not merely something that the press deems
newsworthy ... ."" To hold otherwise would allow the media to
create the standard of fault which the plaintiff must prove simply
by deeming the relevant issue newsworthy and thereby converting
it into a public controversy. Several generalizations can be made
by looking at how "public controversies" relate to athletes and
entertainers.
a. Direct Performance Issues
First, it is fairly clear that issues directly related to an ath-
lete's or entertainer's performance will be deemed "public contro-
versies." Such issues would include the on-field performance of a
player 7 or coach"" or the performance of a model in posing for
photographs."
92. Clark v. ABC, 684 F.2d 1208, 1218 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1040
(1983).
93. Id. at 1218.
94. Street v. NBC, 645 F.2d 1227, 1234 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 454 U.S. 815, cert.
dismissed, 454 U.S. 1095 (1981).
95. Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l Magazine for Men, 754 F.2d 1072, 1083 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 182 (1985). The Court held that drug trafficking of "mammoth propor-
tions" falls within the meaning of public controversy. 754 F.2d at 1083. This could be signif-
icant to athletes because the use of drugs is currently an important issue in the world of
sports.
96. Joseph v. Xerox Corp., 594 F. Supp. 330, 333 (D.D.C. 1984).
97. Holt v. Cox Enterprises, 590 F. Supp. 408 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (plaintiff struck an
opposing player in the face with his forearm during the course of a college football game but
did not receive a penalty).
98. Winter v. Northern Tier Publishing, 4 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1348 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1978) (plaintiff engaged in arguments with and criticized high school football officials during
the course of a game).
99. Vitale v. National Lampoon, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (plaintiff was a
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This result is supported by the two rationales most often put
forward by courts when justifying the vortex public figure classifi-
cation. Athletes and entertainers assume the risk of media com-
ment by voluntarily performing before the public. An athlete "vol-
untarily play[s] that sport before thousands of persons-spectators
and sportswriters alike-and he necessarily assumed the risk that
these persons would comment on the manner in which he per-
formed."100 Similarly, an entertainer who voluntarily poses for
nude photographs published by a national magazine and who re-
ceived payment for their publication, "voluntarily placed herself in
the public domain in the role of a model inviting attention and
comment .. ."101
It is also generally assumed that athletes and entertainers
have access to the press concerning their particular performances.
It was said that the plaintiff in Vitale was "extensively inter-
viewed" in an article accompanying the photographs 0 2 and that
the plaintiff in Holt "continued to enjoy such access to the press"
long after the incident enabling him to rebut any media criti-
cisms.103 Furthermore, it is immaterial that at first [plaintiff] chose
for personal reasons not to avail himself of the opportunity to de-
fend his character. 10 4
b. Indirect Performance Issues
Second, issues indirectly related to an athlete's or enter-
tainer's performances may also be "public controversies," but
courts have engaged in stricter analysis in this area. Courts require
that the controversy be "truly public." 0 "Only a controversy
which attracts the public's interest because it affects persons other
than the direct participants is a public controversy" within the
public figure determination. 06 The court in Waldbaum offered the
singer who posed for some photographs for Playboy magazine).
100. Holt, 590 F. Supp. at 412.
101. Vitale, 449 F. Supp. at 445. The court's reliance upon plaintiff having received
payment for her performance is probably irrelevant. The Holt Court specifically held that
the on-field activities of a football player were "public controversies" even though the player
was an amateur. Holt, 590 F. Supp. at 412.
102. Vitale, 449 F. Supp. at 445.
103. Holt, 590 F. Supp. at 412. The article in this case was published 18 years after the
incident occurred, yet the court found plaintiff to have access to the media "at the time and
in the years that followed." Id.
104. Id.
105. Barry v. Time, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 1110, 1116 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
106. Id. at 1116. The court held that the public controversy requirement was met for
two reasons: first, investigations concerning recruiting violations of the athletic department
1987]
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following definition:
A general concern or interest will not suffice. . .[The court]
should ask whether a reasonable person would have expected
persons beyond the immediate participants in the dispute to feel
the impact of its resolution. If the issue was being debated pub-
licly and if it had foreseeable and substantial ramifications for
nonparticipants, it was a public controversy." 7
Courts also require that there be a real controversy. 08 The Su-
preme Court in Wolston, for example, held that a public contro-
versy did not exist with regard to plaintiff's failure to appear
before a grand jury investigating Communism and "there was no
public controversy or debate in 1958 about the desirability of per-
mitting Soviet espionage in the United States . .. ."'0'
Finally, some courts place emphasis on the plaintiff's efforts to
engage the media in order to resolve the controversy."0 The Court
in Woy, for example, considered the following three prong test: (a)
did the plaintiff voluntarily thrust himself into the vortex of this
particular controversy, (b) what was the nature and extent of his
participation and (c) did the plaintiff encourage the public's atten-
tion in an attempt to influence the outcome of a particular
controversy?"'
c. Issues Unrelated to Performance
Issues unrelated to an athlete's or entertainer's performance
at a state university were ongoing; and second, intimately related nationwide controversy
had developed over the proper role of athletics at institutions of higher learning. Id. at 1116-
17. This suggests a somewhat stricter standard than was applied to the on-field performance
of athletes.
107. Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1296-97 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
108. Barry, 584 F. Supp. at 1113.
109. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 166 n.8 (1979). A strict reading of
this case could have major ramifications in determining whether a "public controversy" ex-
ists. For example, it is conceivable by analogy that a story on drug use in sports may not be
a public controversy because everyone agrees drug use is undesirable. See also Pring v.
Penthouse, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1101 (D. Wyo. 1981), where the court held that plaintiff,
a former Miss Wyoming, was not a vortex public figure because there was no particular
public controversy into which she had thrust herself. The alleged defamation consisted of a
"fictionalized" piece on beauty contests published in Penthouse magazine.
110. Woy v. Turner, 573 F. Supp. 35 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
111. Id. at 38. The Woy Court determined that plaintiff, a well-known sports agent,
was a vortex public figure because he voluntarily thrust himself into the forefront of a pub-
lic controversy-the contractual dispute between his client and the Atlanta Braves baseball
team. Id. Specifically, plaintiff was extended this status because he "was in contact with the
press, television stations and sports magazines regarding the contractual dispute several
times upon his own initiative." Id.
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may still be deemed "public controversies" under certain limited
circumstances. One such circumstance would be charges of crimi-
nal misconduct." 2
The plaintiff in Bell v. Associated Press'13 conceded that he
was a public figure for purposes of stories concerning his role as an
athlete, but claimed he was not a public figure when the defama-
tory story "bore no relationship to his career as a professional foot-
ball player."" " The court disagreed, stating that there is "consider-
able public interest, concern, and controversy with respect to off-
the-field misconduct of professional athletes.""'
Professional athletes can hardly be permitted to hold them-
selves out as public figures, seeking a maximum amount of pub-
licity for themselves and their teams with respect to their ath-
letic achievements, while successfully claiming strictly private
status when misconduct is charged or proved. Their professional
careers and those of other entertainers who seek the public spot-
light are so intimately tied to their personal conduct that such a
distinction would be entirely unrealistic. 6
The Bell court further suggested that any personal conduct
which adversely affects an athlete's position as a "role model in
this community" may constitute a public controversy in determin-
ing if the plaintiff is a vortex public figure.1 7
2. NATURE AND EXTENT OF PLAINTIFF'S PARTICIPATION
Once the requisite "public controversy" has been established,
the next step is to ascertain the nature and extent of plaintiff's
participation in that controversy.
112. Bell v. Associated Press, 584 F. Supp. 128 (D.D.C. 1984) (the media reported that
the plaintiff was reported by the media to have been arrested for lewdness. Actually, an
imposter was posing as plaintiff).
113. 584 F. Supp. 128 (D.D.C. 1984).
114. Id. at 131.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 131-32. This language was written broadly so as to include non-criminal
misconduct as well as criminal misconduct. However, the court relied in part upon the limit-
ing fact that the plaintiff signed a contract with his team with provisions that stated a
player is to "cooperate with the media" and that if a "player has engaged in personal con-
duct reasonably judged by [the] club to adversely affect or reflect" upon it, the club may
terminate his contract. Id. at 131.
117. Id. at 132.
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a. The Clark-Fitzgerald Factors
In Clark v. ABC," 8 the Court of Appeals stated that the "na-
ture and extent of an individual's participation is determined by
considering three factors: the extent to which participation in the
controversy is voluntary; the extent to which there is access to
channels of effective communication in order to counteract false
statements; and the prominence of the role played in the public
controversy."' 19
In Fitzgerald v. Penthouse International,120 the District Court
of Maryland suggested three additional factors: "whether the
plaintiff sought to influence the resolution or outcome of the con-
troversy; whether the controversy existed prior to the publication
of the defamatory statements; and whether the plaintiff retained
public figure status at the time of the alleged defamation.','
b. Application To Athletes and Entertainers
Applying the two-pronged analysis to two cases, one previ-
ously discussed, it becomes clearer how the "nature and extent of
an individual's participation" is important.
In Woy v. Turner,2 2 the court classified Woy as a vortex pub-
lic figure. It noted that Woy "voluntarily" thrust himself into the
forefront of a public controversy, that he "readily made himself
available for interviews and media attention, and that he was a
"major participant" in the controversy (the Clark factors). The
facts also show that Woy did all this to "influence the outcome of
the controversy, that the controversy existed prior to the publica-
tion of the defamatory statement and that Woy retained his public
figure status (the Fitzgerald factors). 23 Thus, it is clear under each
factor of the two-pronged analysis that Woy was a vortex public
figure.
118. 684 F.2d 1208 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1040 (1983).
119. Id. at 1218.
120. 525 F. Supp. 585 (D. Md. 1981), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 691 F.2d 666 (4th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1024 (1983).
121. Id. at 592. The final factor focuses on the importance of the passage of time in
determining if a plaintiff is a vortex public figure. See Street v. NBC, 645 F.2d 1227 (6th
Cir.), cert. granted, 454 U.S. 815, cert. dismissed, 454 U.S. 1095 (1981). The court held that
"once a person becomes a public figure in connection with a particular controversy, that
person remains a public figure thereafter for purposes of later commentary or treatment of
that controversy." Id. at 1235. See also Holt v. Cox Enterprises, 590 F. Supp. 408 (N.D. Ga.
1984) held that the plaintiff, a football player, was still a vortex public figure 18 years after
he struck an opposing player during a game).
122. 573 F. Supp. 35 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
123. Id. at 38.
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In Andreescu v. Lane,12" on the other hand, a Colorado Dis-
trict Court found that plaintiff, a harness racer, was not a vortex
public figure because of a report that certain races were "fixed."' 2
While the court conceded that the plaintiff was "involved in an
issue of concern to the general public," it was not willing to declare
him a "limited" vortex public figure."'
If all individuals who participated in the production of
events open to the public were to be considered as. . . 'limited
public figures,' . . . the media could publish potentially libelous
comments about the track gatekeeper, popcorn vendor or pro-
gram hawker. In other words, the Court must draw the line
somewhere, and here it is drawn short of Dan Andreescu 2 7
This was probably a correct result under the Clark-Fitzgerald
analysis outlined above. First, plaintiff did not voluntarily thrust
himself into the controversy, but rather was brought into it by the
nature of his profession. Second, he probably did not have any real
access to the media in that he was not very well-known and was
not specifically accused of fixing races himself. Third, plaintiff did
not play a prominent role in the controversy-no more prominent
in the court's eyes than the roles of the track gatekeeper, popcorn
vendor or program hawker.
C. Public Personalities
Another category of public figures which is particularly rele-
vant to athletes and entertainers is that of "public personalities."
A public personality cannot be truly classified as a pervasive public
figure except within his or her limited professional realm; nor can
he or she be classified as a vortex public figure since the necessary
element of public controversy is usually not required.12 However,
no separate status has generally been recognized by the courts for
124. 5 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1290 (D. Colo. 1979).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1293.
127. Id.
128. Constitutional Privilege in Libel Law, supra note 20, at 129. The distinction be-
tween public personalities and vortex public figures concerning issues directly related to
their profession is small, if present at all. In all the cases dealing with such vortex public
figures, however, there did exist some "controversy" beyond the plaintiff's ability to per-
form. See Winter v. Northern Tier Publishing, 4 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1348 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1978) (the plaintiff verbally threatened a football referee); Holt v. Cox Enterprises, 590 F.
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this category of public figure. 1 9
The dynamics of the public personality category were first rec-
ognized by the New York Court of Appeals in a professional base-
ball player's invasion of privacy case. 30 The court held that it was
"appropriate to say that the plaintiff here, Warren Spahn, is a
public personality and that insofar as his professional career is in-
volved, he is substantially without a right to privacy.' 31 The court
held that Spahn must show that the defendant acted with actual
malice, thus implying public figure status.132
The Ninth Circuit later applied similar language with regard
to another baseball player in Cepeda v. Cowles Magazine.13 3 It
held that public figures are "those persons who, though not public
officials, are 'involved in issues in which the public has a justified
and important interest.' Such figures are . ..numerous and in-
clude artists, athletes, business people, dilettantes, anyone who is
famous or infamous because of who he is or what he has done.' '3 4
The basic justification for imposing an almost pervasive public
figure status on "public personalities," at least within his or her
professional realm, is that person's unavoidable attempt to seek
publicity. Public performers and entertainers necessarily seek pub-
licity in order to keep their name and their professional talents
constantly in the public eye. Such publicity enhances their fame
and, in turn, their ability to earn money.3 5 Consequently, it is held
that by seeking publicity, the public personality assumes the risk
of negative as well as positive publicity concerning his or her
performance. " 6
Two cases clarify the application of public personality status
to athletes and entertainers. In Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Foot-
ball Club,13 7 the Third Circuit held that professional athletes, "at
least as to their playing careers, generally assume a position of
129. But see Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co., 626 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1980) (this
case provides one exception to the general rule). See also infra notes 128-31 and accompa-
nying text.
130. Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 18 N.Y.2d 324, 221 N.E.2d 543, 274 N.Y.S.2d 877
(1966), vacated and remanded, 387 U.S. 239, aff'd on rehearing, 21 N.Y.2d 124, 233 N.E.2d
840, 286 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1967).
131. Id. at 328, 221 N.E.2d at 545, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 879.
132. 21 N.Y.2d at 127, 233 N.E.2d at 842, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 834.
133. 392 F.2d 417 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 840 (1968) (Orlando Cepeda was a
well-known batter and first baseman for the San Francisco Giants and St. Louis Cardinals).
134. Id. at 419.
135. Constitutional Privilege in Libel Law, supra note 20, at 129.
136. Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
137. 595 F.2d 1265 (3rd Cir. 1979).
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public prominence."1 8 The court specifically declared that an ath-
lete's accomplishments and his or her contractual disputes com-
mand the attention of the public, thereby rendering him or her a
public figure for those limited purposes. Thus, unlike a pervasive
public figure, Chuy was not a public figure for all purposes, but one
only "with respect to his ability to play football."1 9 On the other
hand, there need be no public controversy which is required with
vortex public figures.
In Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co.,1 40 the Fifth Circuit
held both football player John Brewer and his wife Anita to be
public figures and that they would have to prove actual malice.
141
Most importantly, the court determined that the Supreme Court
in Gertz "did not define all subcategories of the public figure clas-
sification," thus suggesting a separate category of public figure
apart from pervasive or vortex public figures.1 42 The court further
suggested that such public figure status is limited to those aspects
of the plaintiff's life that he or she attempts to publicize, either
directly or indirectly.1 4s The first amendment requires that the
press be afforded the protection of the actual malice test "vis-a-vis
those who have sought its coverage, either through direct invita-
tion or by participating in activities whose success depends in large
part on publicity. '14 4
IV. CONCLUSION
The classification of athletes and entertainers as plaintiffs in
defamation suits is a complex and unsettled area of the law. The
courts have distinguished three types of public figures-the perva-
sive public figure, the vortex public figure and the public personal-
ity-each of which must prove actual malice on the part of the
defendant/media in some form or under certain circumstances.
The courts have not, however, provided athletes and entertainers
with any clear guidelines as to how they will be classified.
This article offered comprehensive tests for determining when
a defamation plaintiff should be classified as a pervasive public fig-
138. Id. at 1280. (Chuy was a football player who had been traded from the Los Ange-
les Rams to the Philadelphia Eagles and was involved in a contract dispute with the Eagles).
139. Id.
140. 626 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir.).
141. Id. at 1257 (John Brewer was a successful professional football player and
restauranteur and Anita Brewer was a singer and former wife of Elvis Presley).
142. Id. at 1254.
143. Id. at 1249-58.
144. Id. at 1255.
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ure, vortex public figure or public personality. Furthermore, it has
attempted to explain what effect these tests would specifically have
on athletes and entertainers.
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